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THE HEGEMONIC ARBITRATOR REPLACES  FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY: 
 A COMMENT ON CHEVRON V. REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR  
By 
Camille Hart* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In Chevron Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
parties did not dispute that the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards1 (New York Convention) governed arbitral awards issued 
pursuant to the Bilateral Investment Treaty2 between the United States and the Republic 
of Ecuador.3 The D.C. Circuit further held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act4 
(FSIA) did not require the district court to undertake de novo review.5 The D.C. Circuit 
reasoned that the FSIA allowed federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador if 
certain jurisdictional requirements were satisfied.6 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
enforcement of the arbitral award was fully consistent with the public policy of the 
United States.7  
The D.C. Circuit strongly relied on the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in B.G. 
Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina to reach its decision in Chevron.8 In drawing its 
conclusion, the D.C. Circuit granted arbitrators broad power to interpret international 
agreements between sovereign nations and private actors, as well as deference upon 
judicial review. The culmination of the arbitrator’s authority effectively replaces state 
sovereignty. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Chevron reflects the globalized law of 
arbitration.  
                                                
* Camille Hart is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 4739.  
2 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Ecuador-U.S., Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 103-15 (providing certain legal protections to American and Ecuadorian investors when they engage in 
foreign investment in the reciprocal country; specifically providing that disputes against one of the parties 
arising out of such investments may be resolved by arbitration upon request). 
3 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 204 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
4 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1607 (2015) (enumerating the sole basis for 
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of the United States). 
5 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 205. 
6 Id. at 206.  
7 Id. at 209 (explaining that the public policy of the United States is the “emphatic federal policy in favor of 
arbitral dispute resolution”).  
8 See id. at 205. 
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II.   BACKGROUND FACTS 
In 1973, Chevron Corporation (Chevron) and the Republic of Ecuador entered an 
agreement allowing Chevron to develop Ecuadorian oil fields on the condition that 
Chevron provide below-market oil to the Ecuadorian government for domestic- 
consumption needs.9 The agreement was amended in 1977 and expired in June 1992.10 
As the expiration date approached, Chevron filed seven breach-of-contract lawsuits 
against Ecuador seeking over $553 million in damages.11  
In 1993, the United States and Ecuador signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty12 
(BIT) which took effect in 1997.13 Under this treaty, Ecuador made a standing offer to 
American investors to arbitrate disputes involving investments that existed on or after the 
treaty’s effective date.14 In 1995, Chevron and Ecuador signed a settlement agreement 
conclusively terminating all rights and obligations between the parties but providing for 
the continuation of the pending lawsuits.15 The lawsuits remained unresolved in 
Ecuadorian courts for over a decade.16 
In 2006, Chevron commenced an international arbitration action before a three-
member tribunal based out of the Hague, Netherlands.17 Chevron claimed that Ecuador 
had violated the BIT by failing to resolve its lawsuits in a timely fashion.18 Ecuador 
objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that it had never agreed to arbitrate with 
Chevron.19 Ecuador contended that Chevron’s investments in Ecuador terminated in 
1992, five years before the BIT’s 1997 effective date,20 thus the Hague had no 
                                                
9 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 202.  
10 Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 949 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61 (D.D.C., 2013) aff’d, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015). 
11 See generally id. at 61(“These disputes largely concerned allegations that Ecuador had overstated its 
domestic oil-consumption needs, and appropriated more crude oil than it was entitled to acquire at the 
reduced price.”). 
12 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 202 (“[F]ormally known as the Treaty Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment.”). 
13 Id. at 202. 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Chevron, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
17 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 202-03. 
18 Id.  
19 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
20 See The Republic of Ecuador’s Proof Opening Brief at 2, Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 
F.3d 200 (2015) (No. 13-7103). 
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jurisdiction under the BIT.21 The tribunal rejected the jurisdictional challenge, finding 
that Chevron’s lawsuits were “investments” within the meaning of the BIT.22 The 
tribunal determined that Ecuador had delayed disposition of the lawsuits and awarded 
Chevron approximately $96 million in damages.23 Ecuador challenged the award in the 
District Court of the Hague, the Hague Court of Appeal, and the Dutch Supreme Court.24 
The verdict in Chevron’s favor was sustained at all levels.25  
On July 27, 2012, Chevron petitioned the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia to confirm the arbitral award under the New York Convention.26 
Ecuador raised three arguments in opposition: first, the district court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; second, that 
confirmation should be denied under the New York Convention because the award was 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration and was contrary to United States 
public policy; and third, at a minimum, a stay should be granted until the Dutch Supreme 
Court resolved the then-pending appeal of the award.27 
The district court first determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)28 because the award was made pursuant to the BIT and governed by 
the New York Convention.29 Next, the district court found that that the parties had 
“clearly and unmistakably agreed” that the tribunal would resolve the arbitrability 
question.30 The court then engaged in a deferential review of the tribunal’s arbitrability 
                                                
21 Id. at 2-3. 
22 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
28 The statue provides: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is brought, either to 
enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a 
private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or 
which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, 
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made 
pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if . . . the agreement or award is or 
may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the 
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2015). 
29 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
30 Id. 
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decision and determined that it was clearly supported by the text of the BIT.31 Thus, the 
award was not beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration.32 The district court also 
rejected Ecuador’s public policy argument and denied the requested stay.33 Ecuador 
timely appealed.34 
III.   COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A.   Subject-matter Jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by closely examining the FSIA. The court 
explained that the FSIA grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States.35 However, Congress enumerated several exceptions36 to the 
jurisdictional restriction, which provide the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state in federal court.37 At issue in this case is the arbitration exception which 
provides for federal court jurisdiction “to confirm an award made pursuant to such an 
agreement to arbitrate, if . . . the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty . . 
. in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.”38 
1.   Jurisdictional Standard of the FSIA 
The D.C. Circuit explained that there are two types of jurisdictional authorizations 
under the FSIA: (1) jurisdiction that depends on particular factual propositions, and (2) 
jurisdiction that depends on the plaintiff asserting a particular type of claim.39 Ecuador 
argued that the § 1605(a)(6) exception required the district court to make three findings: 
(1) a foreign state agreed to arbitrate; (2) there was an award based on that agreement; 
and (3) the award was governed by a treaty.40 In contrast, Chevron argued that the 
                                                
31 Id.  
32 See id.  
33 Id. 
34 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
35 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2015). 
36 See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. 
37 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
38 Id. at 203-04; see also 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(6). 
39 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204. 
40 Id.  
  114 
exception permits jurisdiction anytime a plaintiff asserts a non-frivolous claim involving 
an arbitration award.41 The D.C. Circuit determined that Ecuador had the better argument 
and that this case required the fact-intensive jurisdictional authorization analysis.42 The 
D.C. Circuit explained that in most instances, the existence of an arbitration agreement is 
a “purely factual predicate independent of the plaintiff’s claim.”43 Similarly, the existence 
of an arbitral award was a factual question that the district court was required to resolve 
in order to maintain jurisdiction.44 If there was no arbitration agreement or no award to 
enforce, the district court would have lacked jurisdiction over the foreign state and be 
required to dismiss the  action.45  
The D.C. Circuit then outlined the evidentiary burdens of parties to a FSIA 
jurisdictional challenge claim. The D.C. Circuit stated that the plaintiff bears the initial 
burden of supporting its claim that the FSIA exception applies.46 This is only a burden of 
production; the burden of persuasion rests with the foreign sovereign claiming immunity, 
which must establish the absence of the factual basis by a preponderance of the 
evidence.47 The D.C. Circuit determined that Chevron met its burden of production by 
producing the BIT, Chevron’s notice of arbitration against Ecuador, and the tribunal’s 
arbitration decision.48 Once Chevron made this showing, the burden shifted to Ecuador to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the BIT, Chevron’s notice, and the 
tribunal’s decision did not constitute grounds for jurisdiction.49 Ecuador did not dispute 
the existence of these factual propositions as grounds for jurisdiction.50 Instead, Ecuador 
challenged the district court’s conclusion that the BIT was an agreement to arbitrate.51 
2.   When is an Agreement to Arbitrate Made? 
Ecuador argued that its offer to arbitrate in the 1997 BIT did not encompass 
Chevron’s prior breach of contract claims.52 Ecuador contended that before reaching the 
merits of Chevron’s petition, the district court was required to resolve Ecuador’s 
                                                
41 Id.  
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 See Chevron, 795 F.3d at 204. 
50 See id.  
51 Id. at 205. 
52 See The Republic of Ecuador’s Proof Opening Brief, supra note 17, at 3. 
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objection to arbitration de novo, because if Ecuador never agreed to arbitrate, then the 
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition.53 The D.C. Circuit 
determined that Ecuador’s objection to arbitration was not a jurisdictional question for 
the district court.54 The D.C. Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in B.G. 
Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina to resolve whether Ecuador’s offer to arbitrate in 
the BIT encompassed Chevron’s claims and whether de novo review was required.55  
B.G. Group concerned a dispute-resolution provision in a bilateral investment 
treaty (hereinafter “Treaty”) between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which required 
an investor to litigate its claims in the local court system before submitting claims to 
arbitration.56 In B.G. Group, the arbitration panel concluded that it had jurisdiction, 
determined that Argentina had waived the local litigation requirement, and found in B.G. 
Group’s favor on the merits.57 When B.G. Group sought to confirm the award in the 
district court, the court deferred to the arbitrators’ determination and confirmed the 
arbitral award.58 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the award.59 The D.C. Circuit held 
that the interpretation and application of Article 8’s local litigation requirement was a 
matter for courts to decide de novo, or without deference to the views of the arbitrators.60  
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.61 The 
Court treated the treaty as if it were an ordinary contract between private parties and 
concluded that the parties had intended to allow the arbitrator to determine whether the 
local litigation requirement had been satisfied, thus rejecting de novo review.62 In doing 
so, the Court implicitly rejected Argentina’s contention that its offer to arbitrate only 
                                                
53 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 205. 
54 In the court’s words:  
Ecuador conflates the jurisdictional standard of the FSIA with the standard for 
review under the New York Convention. . . . The jurisdictional task before the 
District Court was to determine whether Ecuador had sufficiently rebutted the 
presumption that the BIT and Chevron’s notice of arbitration constituted an 
agreement to arbitrate. 
Id. at 205. 
55 See id. at 205. 
56 B.G. Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1203 (2014).  
57 See id. at 1204-05. 
58 B.G. Group, 134 S. Ct. at 1205. 
59 Id. at 1205. 
60 Id.  
61 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 205. 
62 Id. at  205-06. 
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applied to investors who complied with the local litigation requirement.63 Rather, by 
agreeing with the United Kingdom to adopt the arbitration provision along with the rest 
of the treaty, Argentina formed an agreement with all potential U.K. investors to submit 
all investment-related disputes to arbitration.64 
With this in mind, the D.C. Circuit determined that the present case did not 
warrant de novo review to determine if Ecuador consented to arbitration. In signing the 
BIT, which included a standing offer to all potential U.S. investors to arbitrate investment 
disputes, Ecuador formed an agreement to arbitrate.65  
3.   The Meaning of “Investments” under the New York Convention 
Under the BIT,  
investment means every kind of investment in the territory of one 
Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or 
companies of the other Party . . . and includes . . . a claim to money 
or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated 
with an investment.66  
Ecuador argued that the final phrase, “and associated with an investment,” means that a 
lawsuit must be associated with an investment that existed within the effective period of 
the BIT in order to qualify as an investment under the BIT.67  
The D.C. Circuit determined that Ecuador misread the treaty for two reasons.68 
First, Article I.3 of the BIT provided that “any alteration of the form in which assets are 
invested or reinvested shall not affect their character as investment.”69 Thus, Article I.3 
suggests that an investment continues to exist until it has been fully wound up and all 
claims have been settled.70 Chevron's lawsuits were, therefore, continuations of its initial 
investment in Ecuador and protected by the BIT.71 Second, Article XII limits the 
application of the BIT “to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to 
investments made or acquired thereafter.”72 The D.C. Circuit found that Chevron's breach 
                                                
63 Id. at 206. 
64 Id.  
65 See id.  
66 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 206. 
67 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 206. 
68 See id.  
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 206. 
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of contract lawsuits were associated with its pre-BIT investment activities and existed 
when the BIT entered into force.73 The lawsuits themselves were, therefore, investments 
within the meaning of the treaty.74  
B.   Confirmation under the New York Convention 
Ecuador raised two additional arguments against confirmation of the award under 
Article V(1)(c)  and Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.75 The D.C. Circuit 
ultimately found no merit in the arguments and determined that the district court properly 
confirmed the award in Chevron’s favor.76  
1.   Article V(1)(c) 
Article V(1)(c) of the New York Convention provides that an award may be 
refused if it “deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms 
of the submission to arbitration.”77 The D.C. Circuit determined that the district court did 
not need to reach the question of whether Chevron's lawsuits fell within the terms of 
submission to arbitration because the answer was provided in B.G. Group.78 Additionally, 
Article VI of the BIT provides that the investor company may submit a matter to 
arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).79 The D.C. Circuit explained that a BIT’s 
incorporation of the UNCITRAL arbitration rules served as clear and unmistakable 
evidence that the parties intended arbitrators to decide arbitrability.80  
                                                
73 See id. at 207.     
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 207. 
77 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 207 (quoting Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, art. 5, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739). 
78 See id. (holding that signing the BIT, which included a standing offer to all potential foreign investors to 
arbitrate investment disputes, constituted an agreement to arbitrate). 
79 Id.; see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Dec. 15, 1976). 
80 Chevron, 795 F.3d  at 207-08.  
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2.   Article V(2)(b) 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention allows refusal of an award if “the 
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to . . . public policy.”81 
Ecuador argued that the award discarded the forum-selection clause which required that 
Chevron's claims be litigated in Ecuadorian courts.82 The D.C. Circuit determined that by 
signing the BIT, Ecuador agreed to arbitration of precisely this type of action.83 Ecuador 
also argued that confirmation would be inconsistent with respect for its foreign 
sovereignty.84 The D.C. Circuit found that Ecuador ceded that authority by signing the 
BIT and then failing to resolve Chevron’s suits in a timely fashion.85 The D.C. Circuit 
also found that enforcement of the arbitral award was fully consistent with the United 
States public policy in favor of arbitration.86  
IV.   SIGNIFICANCE  
Chevron is a landmark case because it highlights several important principles 
undergirding contemporary arbitration. In affirming the B.G. Group decision, the D.C. 
Circuit endorsed the arbitrator’s decisional role of interpreting international treaties 
between sovereign nations and private actors.87 The arbitrator’s new sovereign power, 
coupled with great deference by the courts, creates an arbitrator that is vested with 
absolute authority. 
The D.C. Circuit interpreted the bilateral investment treaty between Chevron and 
Ecuador retroactively. In other words, although Chevron’s underlying lawsuits arose 
before the treaty took effect, the D.C. Circuit found that Chevron’s claims were 
encompassed in the treaty, because the BIT was a standing offer to all potential U.S. 
investors to arbitrate disputes.88 The BIT’s retroactive measure has important 
implications for practitioners in all circuits. Practitioners representing sovereign nations 
will have to grapple with the reality of being bound to an arbitration agreement to which 
they did not affirmatively consent. Instead of disputes being adjudicated in their court 
systems, their consent to arbitration will be inferred from the presence of a signed 
                                                
81 Id. at 207 (quoting Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 5, 
June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739). 
82 See id. at 208.  
83 Id.  
84 See id. at 208 (Ecuador claimed “that the Tribunal effectively usurped the jurisdictional authority of the 
Ecuadorian judiciary, the only adjudicative body authorized to hale the Republic into court to respond to 
Chevron's lawsuits.”). 
85 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 209.   
86 Id. at 209 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)). 
87 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 205-06, 209. 
88 Id. at 202, 206. 
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bilateral investment treaty. In contrast, practitioners representing commercial clients can 
take solace in the fact that their potential lawsuits will be construed as investments within 
the meaning of the treaty and, thus, will fall safely under the BIT. 
It is also important to note that before making its way into the D.C. Circuit, the 
dispute between Chevron and Ecuador was appealed to the highest Dutch Court and also 
decided in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.89 The judgment in 
Chevron’s favor was sustained at every level.90 This sine qua non removes the stigma that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in B.G. Group was alien to the law of arbitration or hostile 
to foreign sovereigns. The Dutch court’s identical verdicts in the Chevron case illustrates 
that there is a global law of arbitration and it accepts B.G. Group as good law. 
The globalized law of arbitration has granted substantial deference to arbitration 
tribunals, resulting in all-powerful arbitrators that are equipped with the necessary tools 
to decide issues of international law. Hence, the arbitrators place in the international 
community has been significantly bolstered through the Chevron decision.  
V.   CRITIQUE 
The D.C. Circuit construed the BIT as a contract and found that Chevron and 
Ecuador had intended the arbitrators to decide the scope of the submission to 
arbitration.91 Although the D.C. Circuit followed the lead of the Supreme Court in B.G. 
Group, it is not altogether clear why construing the BIT as a contract to find consent was 
appropriate. In some cases, it is acceptable to presume party consent; however, in cases 
where a foreign sovereignty is a party, inferring consent should never be appropriate 
because the effect of the contract can be detrimental to the state and its citizens.  
FSIA was enacted to grant foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts of the United States.92 The FSIA arbitration exceptions are the sole basis 
for compelling a foreign state into federal court.93 Nevertheless, the circumstances for 
which a foreign state may be compelled to arbitrate are so vast that the exceptions seem 
to function like a handbook on how to compel foreign states into arbitration.94 Ultimately, 
FSIA and the arbitration exceptions grant foreign states immunity with one hand and 
revoke it with the other.   
Using deferential review, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court and the 
arbitration tribunal’s decision below.95 Chevron declares that arbitrators have the 
                                                
89 Id. at 202-03. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  at 205-06. 
92 See 28 U.S.C. §1602 (2015). 
93 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. 
94 See id.  
95 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 209. 
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authority to interpret international treaties between sovereign nations and private actors.96 
Accordingly, arbitrators can determine jurisdictional and arbitrability issues, matters once 
reserved for the courts.97 Arbitrator sovereignty thus replaces the sovereignty of foreign 
nations. Like B.G. Group, the hegemony of the arbitrator is well defined while the 
position of the state is minimized under Chevron.98  
The D.C. Circuit answered the question of whether private arbitrators should have 
authority to command state action all too easily; such a hard question deserves careful 
consideration. While Ecuador’s actions may have been arbitrary and capricious, it was 
still a sovereign state and entitled to respect. Ecuador argued that the plain meaning of 
three separate contracts evinced no intent to submit to arbitration.99 This argument had 
some merit, yet the D.C. Circuit completely disregarded it. This begs the unfortunate 
question of whether a country in the position of the United States would have been 
treated similarly. 
The D.C. Circuit endorsed the arbitration tribunal’s retroactive application of the 
BIT to Chevron’s breach of contract claims. The district court of the Hague, the Hague 
Court of Appeal, the Dutch Supreme Court, and the District Court for the District of 
Columbia all affirmed this view.100 Five different jurisdictions’ approval of the 
retroactive measure demonstrates the globalized law of arbitration. Therefore, what the 
United States has determined regarding the sovereignty of the arbitrator is not contrary to 
the international law of arbitration. The uniformity of international arbitration law has 
useful implications for practitioners because outcomes will be more predictable. 
However, this degree of arbitrator sovereignty conflicts with the basic arbitration 
principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.101 Ecuador vigorously contended that it 
                                                
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id; see also B.G. Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1205 (2014). 
99 Specifically, Ecuador argued: 
First, the 1973 Concession Agreement governing Chevron’s oil investments in 
Ecuador required all disputes arising from that in- vestment to be submitted to 
Ecuadorian courts. . . .  
Second, the 1995 Settlement Agreement and Release between Chevron and the 
Republic, confirming the termination of Chevron’s investment in Ecuador, 
provided that Chevron’s pending lawsuits against the Republic shall continue to 
be heard before the authorities having the appropriate jurisdiction—i.e., the 
Ecuadorian courts.  
Third, in 1997, the Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (Treaty) entered 
into force 
The Republic of Ecuador’s Proof Opening Brief, supra note 17, at 1-2 (italics in original). 
100 See Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203; see also Chevron, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 61. 
101 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,681 (2010) (“[T]he FAA imposes 
certain rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, 
not coercion.’”).  
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did not consent to arbitration, yet the arbitrators in their sovereign capacity found that 
Ecuador submitted to arbitration.102  
The arbitrators in this case upheld the private interests of Chevron Corporation 
and, as a result, reached a very pro-commercial resolution. Additionally, the courts 
treated Ecuador as a commercial entity, especially in construing the BIT as a contract.103 
This phenomenon evinces support for the depoliticization of states in an effort to prevent 
sovereign nations from abusing private actors. However, depoliticization of states in 
arbitration is undesirable because it overlooks the political role of sovereign states. 
Sovereign states have a duty to protect and foster the public interest of their citizens. 
Conversely, depoliticization separates the state’s political identity from the state’s 
corporate identity, favoring multinational commercial entities at the expense of the 
sovereign’s citizens.  
In the end, Chevron was awarded approximately $96 million.104 While that is not 
a substantial figure for a country, and the attorneys’ fees probably cost just as much, it 
nevertheless may be unenforceable if Ecuador is insolvent. Arbitration awards are 
esteemed because they are valid, irrevocable and enforceable.105 But if arbitral awards 
prove unenforceable against foreign nations due to insolvency, what is the point? 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The implications of the Chevron decision are far-reaching. The D.C. Circuit 
grants arbitrators the authority to interpret international treaties and subjects their arbitral 
decisions to great deference. The result is a hegemonic arbitrator with the power to 
effectively shape international law and bind sovereign nations. While it may appear that 
the court has gone too far, the globalized law of arbitration fully supports the D.C. 
Circuit’s approach.
                                                
102 Chevron, 795 F.3d at 203. 
103 See Chevron, 795 F.3d at 205-06. 
104 Id. at 203. 
105 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
